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ABSTRACT 
The dearth of Malaysian based literature on leadership In general, and 
corporate leadership In partlcular suggests that Malaysian scholars and 
Investors are yet to be sensltlzed to the Importance of leadership as a 
determinant of orgamzatlOnal outcomes. Arguably, this inattentIOn helps 
perpetuate many unhealthy myths about corporate leadership. Notable 
among these myths, IS that of the Incompetent Malay managers. In examining 
the myth, this study takes a quantltatlve perspective of an otherwise 
"qualitative'" subject. USing empmcal eVidence from the general Insurance 
Industry, this study demonstrates that Malay chief executive officers (CEOS) , 
despite the myth and market perceptIOns, do not affect corporate performance 
any differently than non-Malay CEOs. 
ABSTRAK 
Ketandusan hasil ilmlah Malaysia berkenaan dengan keplmplnan pada 
amnya, dan keplmplnan korporat khususnya membayangkan bahawa para 
ilmuan dan pelabur Malaysia masih belum lagl prihatln akan pentlngnya 
keplmplnan sebagm satu penentu hasil sesebuah orgamsasl. Bolehlah 
didebatkan bahawa ketldakpekaan 1m telah memanjangkan hayat banyak 
mUos yang tldak sihat tentang keplmplnan korporat. DI antara metos yang 
menonjol lalah yang bersangkut dengan ketldakcekapan pengurus-pengurus 
Melayu. Dalam menelitl metos 1m, kajian 1m mengambil perspektif kuantltatif 
terhadap satu subjek yang lazlmnya "kualitatif' Dengan menggunakan 
penemuan emplrik dan Industn Insurans am, kajian 1m membuktikan bahawa 
ketua eksekutif Melayu, walau pun dimetoskan dan dianggap sebaliknya oleh 
pasaran, tldaklah membawa kesan korporat yang berbeza dengan ketua 
eksekutif bukan Melayu. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the Malays1an context, the subject of a manager's ethmc ongm has many 
unspoken 1mplicatlOns. The busmess sector 1S the ground on wh1ch the silent 
and undeclared battle for ethn1c dommance 1S fought. Since Malaysia's 
mdependence m 1957, the (w1dely believed to be) agranan Malays have 
assumed political dommance and m th1S respect have proven then collective 
ability to lead and govern. Malays1a's lffipress1ve econom1C growth thus far, 
and of the last ten years espeCially, testifies m part that the Malays who make 
up the maJonty of parliament and the c1vil serv1ce can prov1de the country 
w1th the kmd of politIcalleadersrup and adm1mstratIve mfrastructure necessary 
for env1able matenal progress. 
Followmg the racial nots of 1969, collectively, the Malays turned the1r 
attentlOn to the busmess sector. The Chmese and to a lesser extent the 
Indians who traditlOnally control th1s econom1C front naturally do not V1ew 
the new competitors W1th much sympathy. As m all freely com~etItIve 
markets, busmess nvalnes are somet1mes ugly. The comparatively late 
Malay entry mto the bus mess sector and then supposed lack of busmess 
hentage are mdeed weaknesses wh1ch are assailed by the1r established 
competitors. The lore of the mcompetent Malay busmess professlOnals are 
among the many, albe1t taC1tly used "marketmg effort" to remforce market 
share and loyalty. 
On an average day, one 1S most likely to dism1ss such market talks as 
nothmg more than banal ethn1c Jokes or petty slanders. However, from the 
perspective of the agency theory!, talks such as that of the mcompetent Malay 
managers2 have many damagmg 1mplicatlOns. Pnmarily, such talks effectively 
mdict Malay busmess professlOnals as a collectlOn of moral hazards3• From 
the econom1C perspective, the 1mmediate consequence of moral hazard 1S that 
a firm wh1ch h1res Malay busmess professlOnals or for that matter a Malay 
CEO, will mcur relat1V(~ly h1gher agency costs4 than a firm that does not. It 
follows that the Malays are therefore not to be relied for effective corporate 
leadersh1p. In the language of econom1CS, th1S amount to statmg that Malay 
managers are compensated' at rates greater than the1r margmal revenue 
products. 
AGENCY THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL THINKING 
Eisenhardt (1989) proposed that agency theory had mfluenced organ1zatlOnal 
thmkmg m two ways. First, by assummg that mformatlOn 1S a commodity, 
transactable at a pnce, agency theory place emphas1s on organ1zatIon 
mformatIon systems, where such are v1ewed as mvestments m order "to 
control agent opportllmsm" (Eisenhardt 1989' 64). Second, agency theory 
contributes to the development of organ1zatIon th1nkIng by way explic1tly 
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accountmg for nsk Implicanons. By assummg that an organlzatlOn IS faced 
WIth uncertam future outcomes, based on partly controllable mternal factors 
and largely uncontrollable external factors, exammatlOn of the role of the 
manager 10 nsky sItuatIons "extends organlzanonal thInking by pushmg the 
ramificatlOns of outcome uncertamty to theIr Implicanon for creanng nsk" 
(Eisenhardt 1989: 65). 
Agency theory IS charactenzed by two streams of research, poslnvlst and 
agent-pnnclpal. The malO difference between the two streams IS that the 
agent-pnnclpal stream has a broad focus while the poslnvlst focus exclusIvely 
on the specIal case of the owner-CEO relationship 10 large corporatlOns. The 
pnmary atm of the poslnvlsts IS how to best structure CEO compensatlOn and 
desIgn employment contract WhICh link pay to firm stock returns, thereby 
glvmg the CEO mcennves to maxImIze stock returns. Empmcal finding on 
the subject are however mconcluslve. Some studies such as Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) had observed CEO compensanon and stock returns relationshIp, 
others found no such relanonsmp (Kerr & BettIS 1987; Hill & Phan 1991). 
A vanatlOn 10 the POSItiVISt general approach are studies of performance 
difference between owner-controlled firms and management-controlled firms. 
Similar to the earlier case, empmcal findings are still mdefimte. Daily and 
Dalton (1992) for example reject the commonly held belief that founder-
managed firms performs sIgnificantly better than professlOnally-managed 
firms. In exammmg the vanous CEO employment contracts and theIr 
outcomes, the POSitIVIStS have subsumed what a CEO does. Little attennon 
has been gIven to the "toolklt" that enables the CEOs to produce the wealth 
outcomes. In thIS relatlOn, the POSItiVISt approach of agency theory IS dry. 
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND LEADERSHIP 
A trace of the development of leadership theory5 will reveal that this body of 
knowledge has evolved through three distmct phases (Schneshelm & NeIder 
1989). The first phase WhICh started 10 the early 1900s IS known as the "tratt 
phase". In that era the body of knowledge on leadershIp focussed Itself on 
attemptmg to Identify a set of umversal charactenstIcs common 10 successful 
leaders. ThIS approach to studymg leadershIp waned by about 1950 when It 
became clear that there IS no such thmg as a umversal set of successful 
leadershIp tratts. 
The "behavlOral approach" replaced the tratt approach 10 the second 
phase. The preference of thIS era was to study leadershIp 10 terms of styles 
across the autocratIc - partIcIpatIve continuum to determme the most effecnve 
leadershIp behavlOr. By early 1970s, the behavlOral approach gave way to 
the connngency theory. ThIS new thinkmg mode of leadershIp assumes that 
effective leadershIp IS the outcome of the mteracnon of forces 10 the 
sltuatlOn-leader-follower trilogy. Similar to the earlier world-vIew of 
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leadershIp, empmcal studies failed to discover the formula to effectIve 
leadershIp. 
It IS perhaps mterestmg to note that lately there have the occasIOnal 
studies exammmg leadershIp m the traIt perspectIve. Although these studies 
are not aimed at reestablishmg the preemmence of the traIt approach, they 
have certamly put the empmcal baSIS of contmgency theonst under close 
scrutmy Wemer (1978) for example, pomted to the methodologIcal 
weaknesses of Lleberson and O'Connor (1972)6, the much cIted empmcal 
research that showed the melevance of leadershIp m determmmg corporate 
outcomes. Extending Wemer, Thomas (1988) exammed data from Bntam 
and presented results showmg the Importance of leadershIp m mfluencmg 
corporate performance. Mintzberg' s (1973) approach and ItS vanants are the 
prevailing trends to exammmg corporate leadershIp. 
ConceIvably, If a CEO IS of any consequence to the firm, then It will be 
m the ways the CEO performs hIS managenal roles7 (Mintzberg 1973). 
LeadershIp, a role that mvolves directmg and coordinatmg subordinates, m 
conjunctIon WIth the role of the entrepreneur, wherem the CEO IS reqUIred to 
be mnovatIve and a nsk taker, should partly mfluence the wealth outcome of 
the firm. Important as the centrality of leadershIp m orgamzatIOnal dynamICS 
and leadershIp skills may be, It IS doubtful if leadershIp IS "clonable." 
Accordingly we find It msular the tendency for corporatIOns to favor people 
WIth SImilar career speCializatIOns m cases of CEO succeSSIOn as SmIth and 
WhIte (1987) observed. People of SImilar career speCializatIOn, say, 
accountants, may have SImilar technIcal skills, but thIS does not necessarily 
amount to havmg SImilar leadershIp skills8 On thIS line of reasomng, we 
POSIt that there IS no natural monopoly of effectIve corporate leadershIp by 
any raCIal group. 
METHOD 
THE SAMPLE 
We test our hypothesIs on a sample of 54 general (non-life) msurance 
companIes9 Of thIS number, 39 are compames WIth non-Malay CEO and 15 
are WIth Malay CEO. The sample represents 96% of all companIes m the 
mdustry FinanCial data for the sample were obtaIned from the 27th Annutll 
Report of the Director General of Insurance. Appendix 1 shows the 
companIes formmg the sample. 
The msurance mdustry IS chosen for two reasons. First, the mdustry 
offers a relatIvely good mIX of firms WIth Malay and non-Malay CEOs. The 
same cannot be Said about other mdustnes, WhICh, casual observatIOn suggests 
are predommantly represented by compames WIth non-Malay CEOs. In thIS 
respect, even companIes listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange are 
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found to be unsUItable for meanmgful statIstIcal analysIs. Cursory exammatIons 
of the current and past editlOns of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Annual 
Compames Handbook reveal that out of some 300 listed compames, less 
than 30 are companies with Malay CEO. 
Data availability also mfluence the chOIce of mdustry. Owmg to a qUIrk 
m ItS regulatory history, msurance IS the only mdustry m Malaysia for which 
a regulatory agency (currently Bank Negara Malaysia) compiles and publishes 
mdivldual company finanCial mformatlOn for public dissemmatlOn. In thiS 
respect the data are consistently defined across companies. Havmg mentIoned 
the consistency aspect about the data, It must pomted out that the breath and 
depth of what IS made available to the public are limited. Unlike say, m the 
U.S., where msurers are mandated to lodge detailed finanCial statements as 
public documents, MalaYSian policymakers and regulators have yet to fully 
come to terms With the concept of public mterest and mformatIon transparency 
As such, available data only allows the constructIon of rudimentary measures 
of an msurer's operatlOn. 
STATISTICAL METHOD 
The multlvanate analysIs of variance (MANOV A) IS used to test the hypotheSIs. 
MANOV A IS prefered for the reason that It allows simultaneous assessment of 
group differences across a set of charactenstIcs (vanables), while takmg mto 
account the correlatIons across the charactenstIcs iO• ThiS method IS a 
generalizatlOn of the umvanate analYSIS of vanance (ANOV A) which assess 
the group differences one vanable at a tIme (Stevens 1986; Hair, Anderson 
& Tatham 1987). In MANOVA the null hypotheSIS IS tested as follows: 
[1l11] [1l11] • 1121 _ 1121 Ho " -" 
Ilpl Ilp2 
where pn IS the group mean vectors. 
In thiS study the group vanable (CEO) IS bmarycoded '1' for msurers 
With Malay CEOs and '0' otherwise. InformatlOn on the racial ongms of the 
CEOs was obtained from The MalaYSian Insurance Directory 1988/89 For 
the purpose of companson of results, the analYSIS also mc1udes a group 
vanable representmg the type of msurer (TYPE). TYPE IS coded '1' for 
composite msurers and '0' for msurers wntmg only non-life busmess. 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
BeSIdes the nature of data that precludes the constructIOn of peneratmg 
measures of an msurer's operatmg attributes, sImilar to the problem 
encountered 10 pnor studies (Daily & Dalton 1992; Chakravarthy 1986), 
usage of MANOVA presents the umque research Issue of determmmg the 
appropnate set of vanables that Ideally defines corporate performance, or 10 
thIS case, msurer performance. In the absence of a prlOrl of what constItute 
an Ideal msurer performance defimtIOn, thIS study uses eIght vanables 
believed to best define performance. 
PREMIUM TO SURPLUS RATIO (OVERALL) 
The relatIOnshIp between premIUm and msurer's net worth IS generally taken 
as an overall Indicator of the VIability of an msurer's operatIons. 
ConventIOnally, a calculated value of greater that 300 IS conSIdered 
unacceptable as It shows that the msurer IS unduly exposmg ItS net worth to 
greater chances of vanatlon 10 underwntmg nsk (Troxell & Breslin 1983). 
The relatIonshIp IS measured as follows: 
Total Net PremIUms 
OVERALL = --------- x 100 
Shareholders' Funds 
LIQUIDITY RATIO (LIKUID) 
LIqUIdity for a firm In the finanCIal servIces Industry IS cntIcal. In the US the 
measure of liqUIdity, as WIth other Indicators of Insurer performance are 
prescribed by the NatIonal ASSOCIatIOn of Insurance CommISSIOners (NArC). 
In thIS the study followmg adaptatIOn of the NAIC liqUIdity ratIo IS used. 
Cash + DepOSIt + Government Secunues 
+ Government Guaranteed Loans + Corporate SecunUes 
LIKUID = -----------------------
Unearned PremIUm Reserves + PrOVISIon For Outstanding ClaIms 
By conventIon an Insurer WIth a liqUIdity ratIo of less than 1.00 IS conSIdered 
to have msufficlent liqUIdity 10 meetmg ItS obligatIOns to policyholders 
(Troxell & Breslin 1983). 
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CAPACITY CONSTRAINT (COVER) 
The degree of capItal adequacy that an 10surer has 10 wnt10g Its busmess 
IS normally captured by the cover ratIO. 
PrOVISIOn for Outstanding ClaIms + Shareholders' Funds 
COVER = ---------------------
Total Gross PremlUms 
In the U.S. the benchmark for thIS 1Odicator IS that an 10surer should have the 
total of loss reserves and net worth covenng at least 2.5 tImes the net 
premIUms wntten. 
AGENT'S BALANCE-TO-SURPLUS RATIO (AGNMGT) 
It has been observed 10 the U.S. that 10surer WIth hIgh agent balances, 
10dicated by the agent's balance-to-surplus ratIo greater than 40%, are more 
likely to expenence financIal distress. 
Outstanding PremlUms Including Agent Balances 
AGNMGT 
----------------------------------x 100 
Shareholders' Funds 
ASIde from 1Odicat1Og illiqUIdity, hIgh agent balances sIgnal many other 
unfavorable aspects about an 1Osurer. High balances could 10dicate one or a 
comb1OatIOn of the follow1Og problems: (a) 10surer has an 10efficient agency 
manag10g system, (b) 10surer has poor finanCIal control and 1OformatIOn 
system and, (c) 10surer IS rely10g too much on ItS agents to the extend that 
It IS held captIve by agents' dictates. ThIS SItuatIon suggests that 10surer IS 
lack10g 10 market10g strategIes and programs. 
COMBINED RATIO (COMBINE) 
The combmed ratIoll IS an 10dex of an 10surer profitability In asses10g an 
1Osurer's level of profitability, a calculafed value of less than 100 10dicates 
profitable operatIOns, while values greater than 100 suggests otherwIse. ThIS 
ratIo IS calculated as follows: 
COMBINE = 
Net Clrums Incurred + CommISSIons + 
Management Expenses 
----------------x 100 
Earned PremlUm Income 
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UNDERWRITING GAIN (UNDGAIN) 
Although the combmed ratio will mdicate the level of overall profitability, 
the underwntmg gam ratIO IS more specific m that It mdicates an msurer's 
proficIency at forecasting losses on nsks msured. 
UNDGAIN = 100 - Combmed Ratio 
Ideally, an msurer would want the calculated value for thIS ratio to be 
posItIve smce It Implies that the msurer has adequately forecast the dollar 
value of losses on the nsks msured. 
MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY (MGTEFF) 
Unlike clrums mcurred WhICh are probabilistIC, or commissons WhICh may 
be dictated by competitIve forces or mdustrywide agreement, management 
expenses are largely controllable by the msurer. In the absence of refined 
data, a generalized measure of management effiCIency as mdicated below IS 
used. 
Management Expenses 
MGTEFF = ----------x 100 
Earned PremIUm Income 
Insurers WIth relatively hIgh MGTEFF may be deemed mefficient. 
DEPENDENCY ON REINSURANCE (ARISK) 
An msurer may need remsurance for two broad classes of reason: (a) nsk 
diversificatIOn and (b) surplus rud (Webb, Laume, Rokes and Baglim, 1984). 
In the MalaYSIan context however, the second reason IS not applicable smce 
there IS no known regulatory dictate on msunng capaCIty. In thIS respect, It 
seems that regulators and policymakers have yet to fully appreCIate the 
concepts of public mterest and capItal adequacy m the msurance busmess. 
Total PremIUms Pmd for Remsurances 
(in and out of MalaYSIa) 
MGTEFF = ----------------x 100 
Gross PemIUms 
Focussmg on the nsk diversification motives for purchasmg remsurance, we 
are of the opmIon that msurers that cede away comparatively hIgher volume 
of busmess are mtnnsically more nsk averse than others. In the absence of 
better finanCIal mformatIOn, the ratIO shown above IS taken as the proxy for 
nsk averSIon. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 shows the sample and sub-sample averages of the gauges used m the 
analysIs. The capacIty measures OVERALL and COVER suggest that the 
msurers formmg the mdustry, on average, if measured agamst known mmlffium 
standards, lack the financIal capaCIty to conduct busmess, and at the same 
tIme are exposmg theIr eXlstmg shareholders' (policyholders') funds to undue 
nsks of further dimumtIOn. These operatmg charactenstIcs explams the hIgh 
ARISK, mdicatmg that much of the wntten busmess IS ceded away as 
remsurance premmms. Withm the boundanes of our defimtIon of the ARISK 
construct, It can be srud that MalaysIan msurers are hIghly nsk averse. 
TABLE 1. Umvanate tests of difference between Insurers With 
Malay and non-Malay CEO 
Dependent Vanable Mean F-Value Prob > F 
OVERALL 
LIKUID 
COVER 
AGNMGT 
COMBINE 
UNDGAIN 
MGTEFF 
ARISK 
Sample 
(N=54) 
-350,438 
1.23 
0.76 
-44,479 
111.55 
-11.55 
29.47 
41.48 
Non-Malay 
(N=39) 
-485,047 
1.35 
0.67 
-61,561 
111.75 
-11.75 
29.74 
39·.78 
Malay 
(N=15) 
-454.22 0.38 0.5427 
0.95 0.93 0.3383 
1.02 0.96 0.3305 
-68.89 0.38 0.5429 
111.07 0.01 0.9330 
-11.07 0.01 0.9330 
28.80 0.04 0.8370 
45.78 1.61 0.2104 
From the standpomts of natIOnal fund flow and finanCIal common sense 
however, the prevailing state of remsurance arrangement IS entuely 
unsatIsfactory. If the bulk of the premmms were ceded to foreIgn remsurers, 
then the present arrangement serves only to dram MalaySia's foreIgn exchange. 
In thIS respect we can Justifiably say that the MalaYSIan msurers are m reality 
fronts, or are Just elaborately set up agents for foreIgn msurers. On the other 
hand, if the bulk of the remsurance IS done wlthm MalaysIa, then the 
arrangement IS self-declevmg. One can not realistIcally expect msurers12 who 
on average, are themselves lackmg m finanCial capacity to come to the rescue 
m the event of a finanCial cnSlS. 
NotWIthstanding the relatIvely acceptable level of finanCIal liqUIdity 
(LIKUID), the rate at WhICh the msurers are allowmg theIr agents retam the 
premmms they collect (AGNMGT) suggests that the mdustry IS stilliackmg m 
agency and finanCIal controls. It IS perhaps mstructIVe to note that on 
56 Jurnai Pengurusan 13 
average, MalaysIan msurers are allowmg themselves the lUxury of exceSSIve 
trade credit to agents despIte theIr negatIve shareholders' funds. 
Group differences of COMBINE and UNDGAIN suggest that no racIal 
group can claIm they are more adept than others at generatmg supenor 
profitability. With both F-values at 0.01, msurers WIth non-Malay CEO are 
not sIgnificantly different than Malay led msurers. It may be of mterest to 
note that on balance, MalaysIan msurers are obtammg profitability at levels 
close to what the us property and casualty msurers on average are 
expenencmgJ3 Although we are unaware of any msurer management 
efficIency standards, we are mclined to believe that management costs m 
MalaysIan general msurance compames are hIgh, consIdenng about 30% of 
premIUm mcome IS used to pay for management expenses. In thIS respect 
It can be saId that both Malay and non-Malay CEOs still have much to do to 
Improve returns to theIr shareholders. 
Although cursory exammatIOn of the average measures may suggest that 
msurers led by Malay CEOs are m some respect comparatIvely better than 
companIes headed by non-Malay CEOs, the differences between the sub-
samples are all statIstIcally mSIgnificant. Similarly, the result of MANOVA 
assessment as shown m Table 2 also suggests that the overall difference 
between the groups IS not statIstIcally SIgnificant (F-value = 1.5843). From 
Table 2 It does not appear that composItes and companIes wntmg only 
general msurance are differently managed (F-value = 1.4401). 
TABLE 2. MANOV A - Difference III corporate performance 
Independent Test Value F-Value df Error Prob 
Vanable df >F 
CEO Wilk's 0.8057 1.5843 7 46 0.1641 
Lambda 
TYPE Wilk's 0.8202 1.4401 7 46 0.2127 
Lambda 
We approached the subject of the mcompetent Malay CEOs from the 
perspective of corporate performance. On thiS subject we reasoned that if 
mdeed there are mherent differences m the leadership attributes of Malay and 
non-Malay CEOS, then these differences will register themselves m the 
operatmg charactenstIcs of the firms they lead. Recall that m assummg his 
managenal role, a CEO has tremendous mfluence on the poliCies and directIon 
his firm takes m the course of domg busmess. 
In the context of the general msurance busmess, if Malay CEOs are 
mdeed mcompetent, then thIS trait would have manifested Itself m, say, 
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management costs of Malay led msurance companIes that are hIgher than 
what they are 10 companIes managed by non-Malay CEOs. But as the result 
of thIS analYSIS suggests, the difference 10 MGTEFF of msurers wIth Malay and 
non-Malay CEOs IS not statIstIcally sIgnificant (F-value = 0.04). Similarly, 
had Malay CEOs been less than competent 10 managmg theIr agents, AGNMGT 
would have regIstered a hIgher average 10 Malay led companIes than 10 
companIes WIth non-Malay CEO. However as the result stands, observed 
differences are not statIstIcally SIgnificant (F-value = 0.38). The same line 
of reasonIng can be extended to other measures of msurer operatIOn. 
A SIgnificant difference 10 one operatmg aspect compared 10 IsolatIOn, or 
for that matter tlIree SIgnificant differences out of eIght attributes SImilarly 
compared, do not make a case provmg competency or otherwIse about Malay 
CEOs. To be conclusIve one would have to examme the overall difference 
across the gauges 10 use. The MANOV A IS Ideal for such purpose. The result 
of applymg MANOVA to our research questIon mdicates that a CEO'S raCIal 
ongm IS not the varIable accountmg for any observed differences 10 corporate 
performance. By ImplicatIOn, the eVIdence suggest that Malay CEOs are not 
anymore mcompetent than theIr non-Malay counterparts. 
CONCLUSION 
The notIon that a raCIal group IS mcapable or mcompetent at certam economIc 
functIOns IS not trIVIal. From the agency theory perspectIve, anecdotes about 
the mcompetent Malay CEOs carry the ImplicatIon that shareholders are 
unnecessarily mlnImlzmg theIr returns if they were to hIre a Malay CEO, or 
for that matter, Malay busmess professIonals. And if taken 10 the context of 
leadershIp theones, such lore condemn the Malays to be the butt of all traIt 
approach Jokes. In addressmg the questIOn if mdeed there are Justifiable 
grounds for such lore to contInue to eXIst, we exammed the corporate 
performance differences of firms led by Malay and non-Malay CEOs. Although 
thus far we have only exammed the general msurance mdustry, the empmcal 
eVIdence gathered strongly suggests that allegatIons of the mcompetent 
Malay CEOs are nothmg but myths. Observe that the general msurance 
bus mess_ IS complicated owmg to ItS dual portfolio (pure and speculatIve 
nsks) natlIre. If Malay CEOs can stand shoulder to shoulder agamst theIr non-
Malay counterparts 10 a sophIStIcated mdustry, then logIcally, there IS no 
reason to believe that they cannot perform the same 10 other busmesses. In 
a multi-racIal country like MalaysIa, myths such as that of the mcompetent 
Malay CEOS, if allowed to perpetuate, serve no socIally redeemmg purpose 
other than to Justify organIzatIOnal caste systems based on raCIal ongms. The 
tIme IS now that other races accept the Malay natIon as theIr economIC equal. 
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NOTES 
1. Agency theory exammes nsk shanng and behavIOral outcomes m a relatIonship m which one 
party (the pnnclpal) engages another person (the agent) to perfonn tasks which mvolve the 
delegatIon of some declslon-makmg authonty. See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama 
(1980) and Eisenhardt (1989) for evolutIOnary trace of the theory. 
2. The tenns "corporate leader," "manager," and "chief executive officer (CEO)" are used 
mterchangeably. These descnptors are taken to denote the person shareholders hold 
accountable for the perfonnance of the fInn. 
3. In agency theory "moral hazard" refers to the lack of effort on the part of the agent to fulfil 
his contract or that the agent IS workmg more for his self mterest than of the pnnclpal. 
4. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined "agency costs" as the sum of: cost of structunng 
contracts; cost of morutonng the behavIOr of agents; and m some cases the expenditure paid 
to the agents (bonding costs) to guarantee that they will not take certam actIons that will 
harm the pnnclpal. The dollar amount of reductIon m the pnnclpal's welfare as a result of 
agents workIng m therr self mterest IS also part of agency costs. 
5. The mattentIon of Malaysian scholars to the subject of leadership IS an amazement. 
Literature search suggest that there IS yet to be one published MalaYSian study on leadership 
of any kInd. In contrast IS the attentIon given by scholars elsewhere. Memdl and Ehrlich 
(1987, p. 92) described the fascmatIon as follows: 
Stogdill's (1974) well-known Handbook of Leadership contams over 3,00 reference on 
the tOPIC, and Bass's (1981) revIsion of that volume contams well over 5,000 references. 
A search of the Widely used SOCial SCience Citation Index reveals over 3,000 entries 
under the smgle descnptor "leadership" m the penod 1972 through 1983, for an average 
annual rate of about 250 scholarly studies and articles per year (p. 92). 
Assummg that the annual rate 250 studies held constant for the penod 1983 through 1992, 
we estimate that m the last ten years, there have to be at least 2,500 studies done worldWide. 
Agamst thiS number, It IS disappomtIng to note that there IS not one Malaysian based study 
on leadership m general, never mmd corporate leadership. 
6. Workmg on data from 167 Amencan finns, LIeberson and O'Connor tested if corporate 
leadership accounted for differences m organizational perfonnance. In Lleberson and 
O'Connor, leadership IS defmed as the number of years a finn IS under the same preSident 
or charrman. The dependent perfonnance vanables are sales, earnmgs and profIt margm. It 
was found that leadership IS not statIstically SignifIcant. 
7 Mintzberg (1973) proposed that the managenal role compnsed mterpersonal, mfonnatlOnal, 
and declSlon-makmg roles. Withm the major role groups are the followmg sub-roles: (a) 
mterpersonal; figurehead, liaison, and leadership (b) mfonnatIonal; morutor, dissemmator, 
and spokesperson (c) declslon-makmg; entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator, 
and negotiator. 
8. We observed that the MalaYSian mdustrIal and commercial sectors tend to favor accountants 
or lawyers as CEOs, either at the pomt of establishmg a frrm or pomts of CEO successIOn. 
The hlstoncal antecedent to the preference IS that pnor to the era of easy accessibility to 
higher educatIOn, and the emergence of MBAs m the late 1970s, accountmg and law were 
the only two known types of busmess trammg. As such, at the tIme when the MalaYSian 
pnvate sector was at the mfancy stage, lawyers and accountants were the only tramed 
busmess profeSSIOnals available. To therr credit, lawyers and accountants of that era have 
met therr shareholders' expectations. It appears that the preference for accountants and 
lawyers rests on the assumption that the past will replicate Itself, and people of Similar 
speCializatIon will have Similar leadership skills. It might be also of mterest to note that the 
accountmg profeSSion m MalaYSia IS disproportionately represented by the Chmese. 
9. The MalaYSian general msurance mdustry IS charactenzed by the presence of 13 "composites," 
that bemg, msurers wntIng both life and non-life msurance. For these msurers we limit our 
analySIS to therr non-life portfolios. 
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10. MANOV A can be likened to a multiple regressIOn analysIs In the mlITor Image. Instead of 
measunng the statistical significance of a set of Independent/predictor vanables on one 
dependent/outcome vanable, MANOV A measures the significance of one Independent 
vanable on a set of dependent vanables. 
11. Conventionally there are two ways to calculate the combIned ratio: the "financial baSIS" and 
"trade baSIS." The essential difference between the two verSIOns lies In the denomInator. 
Gross premIUms IS used In the trade baSIS versIOn while earned premIUms IS used In the 
financial baSIS. 
12. Malaysian NatIOnal ReInsurance Berhad IS the only professIOnal reInsurer (company 
speCIaliZIng In the reInsurance busIness) In Malaysia. The available statlStltlcs suggest that 
local Insurers are also engaged In the reInsurance bUSIness. 
13. For comparison see U.S. Insurer profitability statistics In Randall (1987). 
Appendix 1 
Insurers 10 the Sample 
Insurer with Malay Chief Executive Officer 
Amencan Home Assurance Company 
The Amencan Malaysian Insurance Sdn Bhd. 
Capital Insurance Bhd. 
Malaysia BntIsh Assurance Bhd. 
Malaysian Assurance Alliance Bhd. * 
Malaysia NatIOnal Insurance Sdn Bhd.* 
Mayban Assurance Bhd. 
Mercantile Insurance Sdn Bhd. 
Prudential Assurance Sdn Bhd. * 
Public Assurance Malaysia Sdn Bhd. * 
Progressive Insurance Sdn Bhd. 
South East ASia Insurance Bhd 
Talasco Insurance Sdn Bhd. * 
Trust InternatIOnal Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
UMBC Insurans Sdn Bhd. 
Umon Insurance Malaysia Sdn Bhd. 
Insurer with Non-Malay Chief Executive Officer 
Amencan InternatIOnal Assurance Company Ltd. * 
The ASia Insurance Co. Ltd. 
Arab-MalaYSian Eagle Assurance Bhd.* 
BntIsh Amencan Life & General Insurance Bhd. * 
Commercial Umon Assurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
East West-UMI Insurance Bhd. 
General ACCident Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
The Great Eastern Life Assurance Company Ltd. * 
Hong Leong Assurance Sdn. Bhd. * 
Industrial & Commercial Insurance (M) Bhd. 
Insurance Company of North Amenca 
Jerneh Insurance CorporatIOn Sdn Bhd. 
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KSM Insurance Bhd. 
London & Pacific Insurance Company Bhd. 
Malayan Insurance (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
Malaysla & Nippon Insurans Bhd. 
MBF Insurans Sdn Bhd. 
Nanyang Insurance Company (M) Bhd. 
N.E.M. Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
Netherlands Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
Norwlch Winterthur Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
Overseas Umon Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd 
Pacific & Onent Insurance Company Sdn Bhd. 
Panglobal Insurance Sdn Bhd. 
The People's Insurance Co. (M) Sdn Bhd. 
Provmclal Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
QBE Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
Royal Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
Safety Life & General Insurance Sdn Bhd. * 
Stralts & Island Insurance Sdn. Bhd. 
Sun Alliance Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
Talsho Marme and Fire Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
Umted Contmenetal Insurance Sdn Bhd. 
Umted Pnme Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd. 
The Wing On Fire & Manne Insurance Co. Ltd. 
Umted Onental Assurance Sdn Bhd.* 
Umversal Life & General Insurance Sdn Bhd. * 
Note: Astenx (*) denote composite msurer. 
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